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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MOTION FOR CHANGE OF
VENUE-IN SEARCH OF A GUIDING LIGHT-State v. Jer-
rett, 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E.2d 339 (1983).
INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law .... "' Where it would be unfair for a defendant to stand trial
in the county where the crime was committed because of a biased
jury, North Carolina has provided for the locus of the trial to be
moved through the use of its change of venue statute. Thus, the
problem of when a motion for change of venue should be granted is
burdened with the dual obstacles of the constitutional requirement
and the statutory standard; but, as will be seen, the court applies
the constitutional test to meet the statutory standard.
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,3 the United States Supreme Court
held that due process requires that the defendant "receive a trial
by an impartial jury free from outside influences."4 The applicable
test to use in determining whether an impartial jury could be ob-
tained in the county of venue is whether there is a reasonable like-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968), the Supreme Court applied the right to a jury trial to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
2. N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-957 (1983):
Motion for change of venue. - If, upon motion of the defendant, the court
determines that there exists in the county in which the prosecution is
pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that he cannot obtain
a fair and impartial trial, the court must either:
(1) Transfer the proceeding to another county in the judicial dis-
trict or to another county in an adjoining judicial district, or,
(2) Order a special venire under the terms of G.S. 15A-958.
The procedure for change of venue is in accordance with the provisions
of Article 3 of this Chapter, Venue. (1973, c. 1286, s. 1).
See generally C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 42-48 (12th ed.
1974 & Supp. 1983).
3. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
4. Id. at 362.
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lihood that pretrial publicity will prevent a fair trail.'
In State v. Boykin,6 the North Carolina Supreme Court
adopted the "reasonable likelihood" test of Sheppard" and held
that the "so great a prejudice" standard of the change of venue
statute8 could be met by showing word-of-mouth publicity as well
as publicity created by the media.9 Although the Boykin holding
broadened the meaning of pretrial publicity, the court in Boykin
refused to find any prejudicial pretrial publicity of either type. 10
Recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court again faced the
issue of prejudicial pretrial publicity in relation to a motion for
change of venue. In State v. Jerrett," the court held that under
the totality of circumstances, the defendant met his burden of
proving that a reasonable likelihood existed that he would not re-
ceive a fair trial before a jury composed of Alleghany County resi-
dents.1 2 The Court expressly based this holding on word-of-mouth
publicity and not on any publicity created by the media.13
The uniqueness of the Jerrett decision in North Carolina case
law makes it significant. This is the first case in this state that has
reversed the trial court's decision not to grant a motion for change
of venue. Likewise, this is the first case where pretrial word-of-
mouth publicity has been found to be prejudicial. This note will
analyze the unique circumstances of Jerrett" in light of the pur-
poses for a change of venue motion and consider the precendential
value, if any, of this case. In addition, the methodology employed
by the court will be examined to determine if it provides a suffi-
cient guide to the practicing attorney.
5. Id. at 363.
6. 291 N.C. 264, 229 S.E.2d 914 (1976).
7. 384 U.S. 333. The North Carolina Supreme Court had formerly used the
"identifiable prejudice" test. This required the defendant to specifically show how
he was prejudiced by the pretrial publicity. See, e.g., State v. Blackmon, 280 N.C.
42, 185 S.E.2d 123 (1971).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-957 (1983).
9. 291 N.C. at 269-70, 229 S.E.2d at 918. The use of the word "media" in this
note will denote the press and radio and television broadcasts.
10. Id. at 271, 229 S.E.2d at 918.
11. 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E.2d 339 (1983).
12. Id. at 258, 307 S.E.2d at 349.
13. Id. at 251-52, 307 S.E.2d at 345-46. See also News and Observer, Oct. 1,
1983, at 4A, col. 1.
14. 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E.2d 339. For a compilation of the North Carolina
cases discussing the change of venue issue, see 4 N.C. INDEx 3D, Criminal Law §
15.1 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
[Vol. 7:73
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THE CASE
In the early morning hours of July 25, 1981, the defendant al-
legedly broke into a family's home on a farm near the Alleghany
County town of Sparta." In the process of the break-in, the defen-
dant allegedly killed one member of the family and kidnapped and
robbed others." The defendant was charged with first-degree mur-
der, felonious breaking and entering, kidnapping and armed rob-
bery.17 Prior to the trial, the defendant moved for a change of
venue. The judge denied the motion.'8 The defendant renewed his
motion both during and after jury selection and these motions
were denied by the trial judge."
In support of his motion of change of venue, the defendant
offered evidence of publicity in both newspaper and radio broad-
casts. In addition, several witnesses20 testified that it would be
hard, if not impossible, for the defendant to receive a fair trial by
an impartial jury made up of Alleghany County residents.' Due to
his strong belief in the right of the citizens of the county be have
the trial held in their county, the judge at the motion hearing de-
nied the motion for change of venue.22
The jury voir dire revealed that a great number of potential
jurors were familiar with the case. 3 Of the jury that actually de-
cided the case, the voir dire revealed that they also were quite fa-
miliar with the case prior to the trial.24 However, each of the actual
15. Id. at 243, 307 S.E.2d at 341. The victims were the Parsons family
members.
16. Id. at 243-46, 307 S.E.2d at 241-42.
17. Id. at 243, 307 S.E.2d at 341.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The witnesses included a radio station sales manager, a deputy sheriff, a
magistrate, and three attorneys.
21. 309 N.C. at 251-254, 307 S.E.2d at 345-47.
22. At one point, the judge referred to this right as "unbridled." Id. at 253,
307 S.E.2d at 346.
23. Id. at 257, 307 S.E.2d at 348-49.
24. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
Of the jury that actually decided the case, . . . ten of the twelve and
both alternative jurors had heard about the case. Four of the twelve ju-
rors who decided the question of defendant's guilt knew or were at least
familiar with the Parsons family or relatives. The foreman of the jury,
Mr. Tom Douglas, stated that he heard a relative of Mrs. Parsons emo-
tionally discussing the case. Six members of the twelve-person jury knew
or were at least familiar with State's witnesses.
1984]
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jurors stated that he could base his decision in the case solely on
the evidence presented at the trial." After the voir dire, the trial
judge denied defendant's motion again.
The jury found the defendant guilty of all charges26 and he
was sentenced to death.17 Pursuant to statute he appealed directly
to the North Carolina Supreme Court due to his death sentence.28
Among other matters, the defendant assigned as error the denial of
his pretrial and trial motions for change of venue.2 9 The court, re-
lying principally on Sheppard,30 Boykin3 1 and Estes v. Texas,"'
held that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant
had met his burden of proving that a reasonable likelihood existed
that he could not receive a fair trial before a jury composed of Al-
leghany County residents. Therefore, the court awarded the defen-
dant a new trial before a jury composed of persons other than from
Alleghany County.33
BACKGROUND
In Irvin v. Dowd, 4 the United States Supreme Court, for the
first time, reversed a state criminal conviction because prejudicial
pretrial publicity deprived the defendant of his right to an impar-
tial jury. 5 Irvin involved a murder trial in which there was exten-
sive adverse and inflammatory pretrial media publicity against the
Id. at 257, 307 S.E.2d at 349.
25. Id. at 276-77, 307 S.E.2d at 359. (Mitchell, J., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part).
26. Id. at 247, 307 S.E.2d at 343.
27. Id. at 249, 307 S.E.2d at 344.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a) (1981).
29. 309 N.C. at 250, 307 S.E.2d at 345. Other assignments of error included
insulficient indictment on kidnapping charge, failure to give jury instructions on
diminished capacity, refusal to instruct jury on the defense of unconsciousness,
and various errors in the sentencing phase of the trial.
30. 384 U.S. 333.
31. 291 N.C. 264, 229 S.E.2d 914 (1976).
32. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
33. 309 N.C. at 358, 307 S.E.2d at 349; see generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law
§§ 193-97 (1961 & Supp. 1983); 21 AM. JUR.2D Criminal Law §§ 378-79 (1981 &
Supp. 1983).
34. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
35. Note, Criminal Procedure-Pretrial Publicity-When Change of Venue
Should Be Granted Despite Results of Voir Dire, 82 DICK L. REv. 616, 618 (1978).
For a complete overview of the change of venue problem, see Annot., 33 A.L.R. 3d
17 (1970).
[Vol. 7:73
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defendant.3 6 In addition, two-thirds of the actual jurors were famil-
iar with the circumstances of the case prior to trial and had formed
an opinion that the defendant was guilty. 7 However, each juror
stated that he could be fair and impartial to the defendant." In
stating the basis for the right that the defendant claimed, the Su-
preme Court said that the sixth amendment "right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of im-
partial, 'indifferent' jurors."3 In specifying what impartiality en-
tails, the Court said "[iut is not required, however, that the jurors
be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved."4 As long as
the jurors could disabuse their minds of any preconceived opinions
and render a verdict based on evidence presented at trial, then the
requirement of impartiality is met.' "[T]he test is 'whether the
nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as in law nec-
essarily .. . raise the presumption of partiality.' """ Applying the
above analysis, the Court vacated the defendant's death sentence
because of the partiality of the jurors, finding that there was actual
prejudice against the defendant.
In 1963, the Supreme Court again addressed the question of
an impartial jury, but this time in relation to the trial court's de-
nial of a change of venue motion. In Rideau v. Louisiana,s another
murder trial involving the death penalty, an interview of the de-
fendant was filmed with the cooperation of the law enforcement
officers and broadcast three times on a local television station prior
to the trial." Three members of the actual jury said they had seen
the televised interview. 45 Without reviewing the voir dire examina-
tion, the Court concluded that the trial judge's refusal to grant de-
fendant's change of venue motion was a denial of his due process
right under the fourteenth amendment.46 The Court in effect pre-
36. 366 U.S. at 725-26.
37. Id. at 728. Some of the jurors stated that it would take evidence to over-
come their opinion. One said he "could not. . . give the defendant the benefit of
the doubt that he is innocent." Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 722.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 723.
42. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878)).
43. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
44. Id. at 724-25.
45. Id. at 725. Defendant's peremptory challenges to these jurors were ex-
hausted and his challenges for cause were denied by the trial judge. Id.
46. Id. at 726-27.
1984]
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sumed the partiality of the jurors due to the televised confession.'
In Estes v. Texas,'8 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
the effect of media publicity during the trial. During the trial, the
press were virtually permitted to take over the courtroom. The
court allowed them to sit within the bar and the courtroom was
overrun with television equipment. 4'9 There was no showing of any
identifiable prejudice on the part of the jurors. The Court said that
identifiable prejudice to the accused was usually required in cases
involving due process deprivations, but "[nievertheless, at times a
procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that
prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due
process."50 The Court held that this was a situation like Rideau,
where the circumstances warranted a finding of presumed
prejudice to the defendant. 1 Although there was extensive pretrial
media publicity, the Court primarily based its decision on the "cir-
cus atmosphere" of the courtroom during the trial52 and the fact
that the trial was "but a hollow formality."
A year later, the Supreme Court again faced a case where the
periods before the trial and during the trial were infected with ex-
tensive media publicity." In Sheppard v. Maxwell,54 the Court
presumed the existence of prejudice without any actual showing by
the defendant." The extensive pretrial and trial publicity con-
sumed five volumes of reports from three city newspapers some of
which urged the arrest of the defendant. 6 Much of the space in
the courtroom, including the area in front of the bar, was assigned
to the media, including photographers. 57 Concluding that the in-
flammatory publicity coupled with the "carnival" 8 atmosphere of
the courtroom mandated a continuance of the trial or a change of
47. A strong dissent by Mr. Justice Clark argued that the defendant had not
met his burden of proving prejudice by the actual jurors who determined his guilt.
Id. at 733.
48. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
49. Id. at 536-37.
50. Id. at 542-43.
51. Id. at 544.
52. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975).
53. 384 U.S. 333, 337-49 (1966).
54. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
55. Id. at 363.
56. Id. at 341-42.
57. Id. at 355. During the trial, pictures of the jurors appeared forty times in
the city newspapers. Id. at 345.
58. See 421 U.S. at 799.
[Vol. 7:73
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venue, the Court set out a new test for change of venue decisions,
incorporating some prior case law.59 Analyzing the case under the
"totality of the circumstances, ' 0 the Court held that where there
is a "reasonable likelihood" that prejudicial pretrial publicity will
prevent a fair trial, there should be a change of venue.'
Almost a decade later, the Court applied the "reasonable like-
lihood" test of Sheppard and found neither actual nor presumed
prejudice against the defendant. In Murphy v. Florida," the de-
fendant, relying on Irvin, Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard, alleged
that prejudice against him should be presumed due to the jurors'
knowledge of his past convictions and of facts surrounding the in-
stant charge." The Court distinguished each of the cases that the
defendant relied upon." Since Irvin was based on actual prejudice,
it had no application to defendant's claim of presumed prejudice . 5
In distinguishing Rideau, Estes and Sheppard, the Court pointed
out that prejudice was presumed in these cases due to the unusual
and inflammatory actions of the press both in and out of the court-
room. 66 Such actions were not present at or before the defendant's
trial. That the jurors had knowledge of the defendant's prior con-
victions and of certain facts about the instant case was not enough
to raise a presumption of prejudice.6 7 Under the totality of circum-
stances, the Court concluded that the defendant had not met his
burden of proving presumptive or actual prejudice."'
Due to the constitutional nature of this area of the law, the
North Carolina courts are substantially bound by the United
59. 384 U.S. at 363.
60. Id. at 352.
61. Id. at 363. The court also stated that the judge may continue the case,
sequester jurors, or grant a new trial if the prejudice threatens the fairness of the
trial. Id.
62. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
63. Id. at 798.
64. Id. at 798-99.
65. Id. at 798. The Court further distinguished Irvin on the following
grounds: in Irvin, 268 of the 430 veniremen were excused for belief in defendant's
guilt; whereas, in Murphy, only 20 of the 78 potential jurors were excused for a
prior belief in defendant's guilt. Therefore, the general hostility of the community
against the defendant in Murphy is not as great as the hostility that existed in
Irvin. Id. at 803.
66. Id. at 798-99.
67. Id. at 799. The Court noted that the news articles from which the jurors
gained their knowledge appeared in print more than seven months prior to the
jury selection. Id. at 802.
68. Id. at 803. Mr. Justice Brennan dissented. Id. at 804.
1984]
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States Supreme Court decisions discussed above. In State v.
Boykin,6 9 the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the "reason-
able likelihood" standard of proof first used in Sheppard.70 Fur-
thermore, the court expanded the boundaries for the type of pub-
licity that would require a court to grant a change of venue
motion. 1 In addition to media publicity, the court held that a
change of venue motion should be granted when word-of-mouth
publicity causes prejudice to the defendant. 72 In Boykin, the de-
fendant attempted to prove prejudice by an informal opinion poll
conducted by his attorney. 3 The court doubted the reliability of
the poll and held that the defendant failed to carry his burden of
proof in showing a reasonable likelihood of prejudice. 4
Thus, in North Carolina, an appellate court will find that the
trial judge abused his discretion in denying a motion for change of
venue only if there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial can-
not be conducted in the present county of venue. Actual prejudice
need not be shown and the prejudice can result from either media
publicity or word-of-mouth publicity. Using the above case law, an
analysis of the Jerrett decision will follow.
ANALYSIS
In Jerrett,7 5 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
under the totality of the circumstances the defendant had met his
burden of proving the that here was a reasonable likelihood that
prospective jurors would base their decision on pretrial publicity
rather than on evidence introduced at trial. The "circumstances"
upon which the court based its decision were the testimony of the
witnesses at the pretrial hearing the and voir dire examination of
the jury.
At the outset, it should be noted that this case is unlike any
other case previously decided by either the United States Supreme
Court or the North Carolina Supreme Court because apparently
69. 291 N.C.264, 229 S.E.2d 914 (1976).
70. Id. at 269-70, 229 S.E.2d at 918.
71. Id. at 269-70, 229 S.E.2d at 917-18.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 270, 229 S.E.2d at 918. The poll asked persons if they had heard
certain rumors about the case. Defendant's counsel provided the number of per-
sons who had heard the rumors, but failed to introduce the number of persons
who said they had not heard the rumors.
74. Id. at 271, 229 S.E.2d at 918.
75. 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E.2d 339 (1983).
[Vol. 7:73
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the decision is based solely on word-of-mouth publicity76 This is
the first time a North Carolina court has ever found that the trial
court has abused its discretion in denying a change of venue mo-
tion. As was stated in Boykin, where the court first recognized the
word-of-mouth type of prejudicial publicity, "this court is sensitive
to the difficulty of proving prejudice generated by 'private talk.' At
the same time, this court must be solicitous of the potential for
manufacture and manipulation of proof of this type of
prejudice."'7 7 The question remains whether the "difficulty" of
proving word-of-mouth prejudice was validly overcome in Jerrett.
Although the majority opinion did not make this clear, there
are two ways that a defendant can meet his burden of proving par-
tiality on the part of the jurors.78 First, a defendant could show
actual prejudice as was done in Irvin .79 This involves circum-
stances, for example, where actual jurors on voir dire state that
they have formed an opinion that the defendant was guilty and go
"so far as to say that it would take evidence to overcome their be-
lief" in his guilt.80 Presumably, this is the type of prejudice that
the court referred to when it stated: "Our cases indicate that a de-
fendant, in meeting his burden of showing that pretrial publicity
precluded him from receiving a fair trial, must show that jurors
have prior knowledge concerning the case, that he exhausted pe-
remptory challenges and that a juror objectionable to the defen-
dant sat on the jury."8 ' Before the decision in Jerrett, this showing
was apparently the only way a defendant could meet his burden of
proof on a motion for change of venue.82 As in prior cases, the de-
fendant in Jerrett was unable to meet his burden of proving actual
76. However, it is unclear exactly what the court bases its decision on; but it
is clear that media publicity is not the basis for the prejudice found. 309 N.C. at
251, 307 S.E.2d at 345.
77. 291 N.C. at 270, 229 S.E.2d at 918. This is not to suggest that the evi-
dence was manufactured in Jerrett.
78. 421 U.S. at 798.
79. 366 U.S. at 717.
80. Id. at 728. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798.
81. 309 N.C. at 255, 307 S.E.2d at 347-48.
82. See, e.g., State v. Dobbins, 306 N.C. 342, 293 S.E.2d 162 (1982); State v.
Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981); State v. Harrill, 289 N.C. 186, 221
S.E.2d 325, death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 904 (1976); State v. Thompson, 287
N.C. 303, 214 S.E.2d 742 (1975). However, it could be argued that Boykin im-
pliedly approved a finding of presumed prejudice when the court adopted the rea-
sonable likelihood test.
19841
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prejudice.8 3
The second way that a defendant can meet his burden of proof
is by showing presumptive prejudice under the totality of the cir-
cumstances test of Sheppard.4 This is the rationale adopted by
the court in Jerrett.8 5 The cases in which the United States Su-
preme Court has applied the presumptive prejudice doctrine have
been unusual, extreme ones where the media have infected the
criminal justice system in some way.86 In Rideau, prejudice was
presumed where the defendant's confession prior to trial was
broadcast several times by the local television station.87 In Estes,
the Court relied on the carnival atmosphere of the courtroom dur-
ing the trial in presuming that the defendant received an unfair
trial.8 8 Finally, in Sheppard, the Court presumed prejudice due to
the inflammatory media publicity and the virtual takeover of the
courtroom by the press.89
The facts in Jerrett are simply not analogous to any of these
Supreme Court cases where prejudice was presumed. Yet the
North Carolina Supreme Court goes so far as to say that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the evidence at the pretrial hearing
was sufficient to grant the defendant's change of venue motions.90
There were no special circumstances before or during the trial in-
volving the media or any other type of publicity that warranted
such a finding. In fact, the court expressly rejected the notion that
any pretrial publicity by the media had any prejudicial effect upon
the defendant. 91 Nevertheless, the court seemingly relied on both
Sheppard and Estes.92 The testimony at the pretrial hearing con-
sisted of six witnesses who stated that in their opinion the defen-
83. 309 N.C. at 256, 307 S.E.2d at 348. Although this proposition is not ex-
pressly stated, the court would have resorted to the actual prejudice test if defen-
dant was able to prove it.
84. 421 U.S. at 798-99.
85. 309 N.C. 254, 256, 307 S.E.2d at 347-48.
86. Although Estes and Rideau were decided before the Sheppard totality of
the circumstances test evolved, they were the forerunners of Sheppard and are
considered to be examples of the application of the presumptive prejudice doc-
trine. 421 U.S. 798-99.
87. 373 U.S. at 724, 726.
88. 381 U.S. at 536-37; see also 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975).
89. 384 U.S. at 363.
90. 309 N.C. at 256, 307 S.E.2d at 348.
91. Id. at 251, 307 S.E.2d at 345.
92. Id. at 256, 307 S.E.2d at 348; accord id. at 274, 307 S.E.2d at 358 (Mitch-
ell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
[Vol. 7:73
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dant could not receive a fair trial from an impartial jury made up
of the county residents.93 To hold that this testimony, in itself, is
enough to find that the trial court abused its discretion, is to delve
into imaginative analogies to the prior case law. In light of Shep-
pard, Estes, and Boykin, that testimony does not rise to the level
necessary to overcome the presumption of the impartiality of the
jurors.
Even when you consider evidence of the jury voir dire exami-
nation, an analogization of Jerrett to the other presumptive
prejudice cases does not follow. In Jerrett the majority noted the
jury's familiarity with the case and some of the state's witnesses. 94
This may well be a minor point to consider in examining the total-
ity of the circumstances, but it certainly does not deserve much
weight. As Mr. Justice Mitchell pointed out in his dissenting95
opinion:
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to
the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to
rebut the presumption of a prospective jurors' [sic] impartiality
would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the
juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court.96
The fact that none of the jurors had formed an opinion as to
the defendant's guilt prior to the trial97 should remove any
thoughts of partiality on their part. As noted by Mr. Justice
Mitchell, where many of the veniremen will admit to prejudicial
opinions about the defendant's guilt, the reliability of the other
veniremen who do not admit to such prejudice may be doubted."
However, such a situation is not presented here. Of the veniremen
questioned at the trial in Jerrett, the court excused only sixteen
because of their preconceived opinions as to defendant's guilt,99
and by the time the twelve jurors were selected, the defendant had
not exhausted his peremptory challenges. 100 Of the actual jurors
93. Id. at 251-54, 307 S.E.2d at 346-47.
94. See supra note 24.
95. Dissenting in part and concurring in part.
96. 309 N.C. at 278, 307 S.E.2d at 360 (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723).
97. Id. at 276, 307 S.E.2d at 359 (a point that the majority omits).
98. Id.; see 421 U.S. at 803.
99. 309 N.C. at 276, 307 S.E.2d at 359. This is in contrast to Irvin where
ninety percent of the veniremen and eight of the actual jurors had preconceived
opinions as to the defendant's guilt. See supra note 65.
100. Id. at 278, 307 S.E.2d at 360; see C. TORcIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PRO-
19841
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who decided the defendant's guilt, each said that he could base his
decision on the evidence presented at trial.10 1 In the past, the
North Carolina courts have placed much emphasis on the fact that
jurors stated they could free their minds of any preconceived opin-
ions and base their decision on the evidence presented at the trial.
In a 1983 case just prior to Jerrett, the deciding factor in the
court's decision to deny a defendant's motion for change of venue
was the fact that the jurors said they could base their decision
solely on the evidence presented at the trial.10 2 This was precisely
the situation presented in Jerrett. In sum, the court's reliance on
the pretrial testimony and on the juror's knowledge of the case in
finding abuse of discretion seems misplaced in light of prior North
Carolina case law.
The majority's use of the totality of the circumstances test,
though the propriety of its use is supported by Sheppard, creates a
fog over the decision and provides little guidance for the legal
practitioner. Although the legal basis for the court's decision would
have still been doubtful, the court could have reached the same
conclusion in a better reasoned manner that would have provided
more direction for the practicing attorney. In Commonwealth v.
Casper,10 3 the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the change
of venue problem in a well reasoned manner. The Pennsylvania
court enumerated five specific factors to examine when ruling on a
change of venue motion:
CEDURE §43 at 129 (12th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1983).
101. Id. at 276-77, 307 S.E.2d at 359.
102. The North Carolina Supreme Court said:
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that the pretrial publicity was not
that prejudicial or inflammatory are the potential jurors' responses to
questions asked at the voir dire hearing conducted to select the jury ...
More important however, each juror selected to hear defendant's case
unequivocally answered in the affirmative when asked if they could set
aside what they had previously heard about defendant's case and deter-
mine defendant's guilt or innocence based solely on the evidence intro-
duced at trial. In sum, therefore we hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a change of venue.
State v. Richardson, 308 N.C. 470, 480-81, 302 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1983)
By not giving much weight to this factor in Jerrett, the court may have rec-
ognized that it is impractical to ask a juror to do such mental gymnastics. Once a
juror has heard something about a case, it is difficult, if not impossible, for him to
disabuse his mind of this matter when rendering a verdict.
103. 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 21, 375 A.2d 737 (1977), rev'd as to interpretation of
stated factors, 481 Pa. 143, 392 A.2d 287 (1978).
[Vol. 7:73
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1. the extent of pre-trial publicity;
2. the nature of the pre-trial publicity;
3. the nature of the community which was subject to the pre-trial
publicity and where the trial was scheduled to take place;
4. the source or sources of the pre-trial publicity, including the
possibility of prosecutorial misconduct, in creating an atmosphere
of hostility toward the accused; and
5. the familiarity of the accused's name with the local populace
prior to the time when the charges were brought against him for
which he is being tried.'"
If the court in Jerrett had formulated some express factors to
be considered under the totality of the circumstances test, the de-
cision would have been better reasoned and the criminal defense
lawyer would be in a better position to know what he needs to
show in moving for a change of venue.0 5
Although the decision in Jerrett is not based on any strong
legal precedent, the apparent underlying reason for the court's ul-
timate conclusion is a sound principle of our criminal law: "our
system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.' 06 The supreme court expresses its ap-
prehension as to the actual fairness of the trial the defendant re-
ceived10 7 by noting the small population of the county'0 8 and the
remarks made by the trial court at the pretrial hearing with re-
spect to the unrestrained right of the county residents to have the
case tried in their county. 0 9 In granting a new trial under the to-
tality of the circumstances test, the court in effect, found that the
"probability of unfairness"110 existed at the defendant's trial.
104. 249 Pa. Super. Ct. at 32-33, 375 A.2d at 743; see also Note, Criminal
Procedure-Pretrial Publicity- When Change of Venue Should Be Granted De-
spite Results of Voir Dire, 82 DICK L. REv. 616, 617 n.2 (1978).
105. For instance, the pretrial testimony could have been analyzed under fac-
tor (1) of Casper and the fact that it was word-of-mouth publicity could have
been analyzed under factor (2).
106. 309 N.C. at 256, 307 S.E.2d at 348 (originally quoting In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
107. In death cases, the court is inclined to review the assignment of errors
with more caution. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 362 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981).
108. Alleghany County-population 9,587. 309 N.C. at 252 n.1, 307 S.E.2d at
346 n.1. The court said that it is "extremely significant to note that here, the
crime occurred in a small, rural and closely-knit county where the entire county
was, in effect a neighborhood." Id. at 256, 307 S.E.2d at 348.
109. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
110. Supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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Since the result reached by the court seems to be based pri-
marily on the relatively small size of the county, an analysis under
the Casper factors would have been quite simple. Point three of
the Casper factors concerns the "nature of the community." 111 By
basing its decision on a factor such as this and enumerating other
factors, the court in Jerrett could have given some form to the "to-
tality of the circumstances." As it is now, an attorney is left to
guesswork in deciding what factors a court will consider in ruling
on a change of venue motion.
CONCLUSION
In State v. Jerrett12 the North Carolina Supreme Court held
under the totality of the circumstances the defendant met his bur-
den of proving that a reasonable likelihood existed that he could
not receive a fair and impartial trial before before a jury composed
of Alleghany County residents. Thus, the court found that both
the pretrial and trial judges abused their discretion in denying the
defendant's motion for change of venue.
The court based its decision on the prior case law of Shep-
pard,"' Estes14 and Boykin. 1 5 The court has extended what con-
stitutes abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in ruling
on a change of venue motion far beyond any limits previously set.
Although the above cases were cited as the apparent basis for the
court's ruling, it is unclear how this decision will effect future deci-
sions in the change of venue area. If the court had identified spe-
cific criteria that it would examine in future change of venue rul-
ings, as was done in Casper,"6 trial judges and attorneys would be
more certain as to the correctness of their rulings and arguments in
the future. By not clarifying this area at this time, the state su-
preme court risks the problem of creating needless delay in the
future by the granting of new trials.
However, due to the vagueness of the court's opinion and the
significance that this opinion places on the particular facts of this
case, it is likely that the legal value of this decision is limited to
those particular facts. Probably the only precedential value that
111. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
112. 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E.2d 339.
113. 384 U.S. 333.
114. 381 U.S. 532.
115. 291 N.C. 264, 229 S.E.2d 914.
116. 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 21, 375 A.2d 737.
[Vol. 7:73
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss1/4
1984] CHANGE OF VENUE 87
this possesses is in its application to the very small, rural counties
of North Carolina.
Buxton Sawyer Copeland
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